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Lopez, Angel and Rey, Patrick
(2016)
Foreclosing Competition through Access Charges and Price Discrimination.
Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 64 (n° 3).
pp. 436-465.
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Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/29201
Identification Number : 10.1111/joie.12115
Abstract
This article analyzes competition between two asymmetric networks, an incumbent and a new entrant. Networks compete in non-linear tarifs and may charge different prices for on-net and off-net calls. When access charges are high, this allows the incumbent to foreclose the market in a profitable way if switching costs are sufficiently large. In the absence of termination-based price discrimination, however, such foreclosure strategies are not profitable.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | September 2016 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 21 Sep 2015 13:08 |
| Last Modified: | 29 Jun 2021 08:12 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:29201 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/16873 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Foreclosing Competition through Access Charges and Price Discrimination. (deposited 18 Jan 2012 06:00)
- Foreclosing Competition through Access Charges and Price Discrimination. (deposited 21 Sep 2015 13:08) [Currently Displayed]
