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Martimort, David
and Sand-Zantman, Wilfried
(2016)
A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate Agreements.
Journal of the European Economic Association, 14 (3).
pp. 669-718.
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Abstract
We analyze environmental agreements in contexts with asymmetric
information, voluntary participation by sovereign countries and possibly
limited enforcement. Taking a mechanism design perspective, we study
how countries can agree on effort levels and compensations to take into account
multilateral externalities. We delineate conditions for efficient agreements
and trace out possible inefficiencies to the conjectures that countries
hold following disagreement. We show how optimal mechanisms admit
simple approximations with attractive implementation properties. Finally,
we also highlight how limits on commitment strongly hinder performances
of optimal mechanisms.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | 2016 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | public goods, incentive constraints, mechanism design, global warming |
| JEL Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information H23 - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies Q54 - Climate; Natural Disasters |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 16 Mar 2015 14:56 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:49 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:29080 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/16710 |
Available Versions of this Item
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A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate Agreements. (deposited 18 Jan 2012 05:45)
- A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate Agreements. (deposited 16 Mar 2015 14:56) [Currently Displayed]
