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De Donder, Philippe
and Roemer, John E.
(2009)
Mixed Oligopoly Equilibria when Firm's Objectives are Endogenous.
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 27 (n°3).
pp. 414-423.
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Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/10023
Identification Number : 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2008.11.003
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | May 2009 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 18 Jan 2012 05:49 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:34 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:10023 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/1669 |
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Mixed Oligopoly Equilibria when Firms' Objectives are Endogenous. (deposited 18 Jan 2012 05:49)
- Mixed Oligopoly Equilibria when Firm's Objectives are Endogenous. (deposited 18 Jan 2012 05:49) [Currently Displayed]
