Jeon, Doh-Shin and Menicucci, Domenico (2014) Buyer Group and Buyer Power When Sellers Compete. TSE Working Paper, n. 14-543, Toulouse
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Abstract
We study how the formation of a buyer group affects buyer power when sellers compete and buyers operate in separate markets. Previous research (Inderst and Shaffer, 2007, and Dana, 2012) has considered a buyer group that can commit to an exclusive purchase and has found that the formation of a buyer group strictly increases buyer power unless buyers have identical preferences. In contrast, we assume that no commitment to exclusive purchases is possible. We find that the formation of a buyer group has no effect if each seller's cost function is concave. If it is strictly convex, the buyer group strictly reduces the buyers'total payoff as long as the Pareto-dominant equilibrium for sellers is played when a buyer group is formed.
Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
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Language: | English |
Date: | 26 November 2014 |
Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | Buyer Group, Buyer Power, Competition in Non-linear Tariffs, Discriminatory Offers, Common Agency |
JEL Classification: | D4 - Market Structure and Pricing K21 - Antitrust Law L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices L82 - Entertainment; Media (Performing Arts, Visual Arts, Broadcasting, Publishing, etc.) |
Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
Site: | UT1 |
Date Deposited: | 16 Mar 2015 14:53 |
Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:49 |
OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:28819 |
URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/16642 |
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