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Cavagnac, Michel
and Cheikbossian, Guillaume
(2015)
Trade Policy, Mergers, and Product Differentiation.
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 171 (2).
pp. 330-354.
This is the latest version of this item.
Abstract
We analyze the welfare effects of mergers in a strategic trade-policy environment. A merger in one country changes the strategic behavior of all firms in the markets, which in turn modifies the strategic interaction between governments in the policy game. Consequently, the results strongly contrast with those obtained in a laissez-faire economy. Under quantity competition, a merger is always profitable to the host country and can also be profitable to the competing country if products are sufficiently differentiated. Under price competition, a merger is always profitable to both countries – but it is more profitable to the host country.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | 2015 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Strategic trade policy, mergers, product differentiation, Cournot competition, Bertrand competition |
| JEL Classification: | D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection F12 - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies F13 - Commercial Policy; Protection; Promotion; Trade Negotiations; International Trade Organizations L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 16 Mar 2015 14:51 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:49 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:28750 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/16618 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Merger, Product Differentiation, and Trade Policy. (deposited 09 Jul 2014 17:35)
- Trade Policy, Mergers, and Product Differentiation. (deposited 16 Mar 2015 14:51) [Currently Displayed]
