Tools
Tools
Nocke, Volker and Rey, Patrick
(2014)
Exclusive Dealing and Vertical Integration in Interlocking Relationships.
TSE Working Paper, n. 14-515, Toulouse
There is a more recent version of this item available.
Preview |
Text
Download (468kB) | Preview |
Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/28372
Abstract
We develop a model of interlocking bilateral relationships between upstream manufacturers that produce differentiated goods and downstream retailers that compete imperfectly for consumers. Contract offers and acceptance decisions are private information to the contracting parties. We show that both exclusive dealing and vertical integration between a manufacturer and a retailer lead to vertical foreclosure, at the detriment of consumers and society. Finally, we show that firms have indeed an incentive to sign such contracts or to integrate vertically.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | July 2014 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Vertical relations, exclusive dealing, vertical merger, foreclosure, bilateral contracting |
| JEL Classification: | D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L42 - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 16 Mar 2015 14:49 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:49 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:28372 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/16548 |
Available Versions of this Item
- Exclusive Dealing and Vertical Integration in Interlocking Relationships. (deposited 16 Mar 2015 14:49) [Currently Displayed]
