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Menicucci, Domenico, Hurkens, Sjaak and Jeon, Doh-Shin
(2014)
On the Optimality of Pure Bundling for a Monopolist.
, Toulouse
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Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/28352
Abstract
This paper considers a monopolist selling two objects to a single buyer with privately observed valuations. We prove that if each buyer’s type has a non-negative virtual valuation for each object, then the optimal price schedule is such that the objects are sold only in a bundle; weaker conditions suffice if valuations are independently and identically distributed. Under somewhat stronger conditions, pure bundling is the optimal sale mechanism among all individually rational and incentive compatible mechanisms.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | 7 July 2014 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Monopoly Pricing, Price discrimination, Multi-dimensional mechanism design, Pure Bundling |
| JEL Classification: | D42 - Monopoly D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 10 Jul 2014 17:09 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:49 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:28352 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/16222 |
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- On the Optimality of Pure Bundling for a Monopolist. (deposited 10 Jul 2014 17:09) [Currently Displayed]
