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Renault, Jérôme
, Solan, Eilon and Vieille, Nicolas
(2013)
Dynamic sender–receiver games.
Journal of Economic Theory, 148 (2).
pp. 502-534.
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Abstract
We consider a dynamic version of sender–receiver games, where the sequence of states follows an irreducible Markov chain observed by the sender. Under mild assumptions, we provide a simple characterization of the limit set of equilibrium payoffs, as players become very patient. Under these assumptions, the limit set depends on the Markov chain only through its invariant measure. The (limit) equilibrium payoffs are the feasible payoffs that satisfy an individual rationality condition for the receiver, and an incentive compatibility condition for the sender.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | March 2013 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Sender–receiver, Dynamic games, Bayesian games, Communication, Repeated games |
| JEL Classification: | C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 09 Jul 2014 17:43 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:48 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:28029 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15870 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Dynamic Sender-Receiver Games. (deposited 09 Jul 2014 17:16)
- Dynamic sender–receiver games. (deposited 09 Jul 2014 17:43) [Currently Displayed]
