Tools
Tools
Rey, Patrick
and Tirole, Jean
(2013)
Price Caps as Welfare-Enhancing Coopetition.
TSE Working Paper, n. 13-439, Toulouse
Preview |
Text
Download (886kB) | Preview |
Abstract
The paper makes two related contributions. First, and in contrast
with the rich body of literature on collusion with (mainly perfect)
substitutes, it derives general results on the sustainability of tacit
coordination for a class of nested demand functions that allows for
the full range between perfect substitutes and perfect complements.
Second, it studies the desirability of joint marketing alliances, an
alternative to mergers. It shows that a combination of two informationfree
regulatory requirements, mandated unbundling by the joint marketing
entity and unfettered independent marketing by the firms, makes
joint-marketing alliances always socially desirable, whether tacit coordination
is feasible or not.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | 23 October 2013 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | tacit collusion, cooperation, substitutes and complements, essentiality, joint marketing agreements, patent pools, independent licensing, unbundling, co-opetition |
| JEL Classification: | D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection L24 - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures; Technology Licensing L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices O34 - Intellectual Property Rights - National and International Issues |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 09 Jul 2014 17:39 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:48 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:27695 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15757 |
Available Versions of this Item
- Price Caps as Welfare-Enhancing Coopetition. (deposited 09 Jul 2014 17:39) [Currently Displayed]
