Ambec, Stefan, Garapin, Alexis, Muller, Laurent, Reynaud, Arnaud and Sebi, Carine (2014) Regulatory instruments to protect the commons: An experimental investigation. Environmental and Resource Economics, 58 (2). pp. 219-244.

This is the latest version of this item.

[thumbnail of wp_bee_100_2009.pdf]
Download (837kB) | Preview
Identification Number : 10.1007/s10640-013-9700-9


In a laboratory experiment we test three regulations imposed on a common-pool resource game with heterogeneous users: an access fee and subsidy scheme, transferable quotas and non-transferable quotas. We calibrate the game so that all regulations improve users’ profits compared to free-access extraction. We compare the regulations according to five criteria: resource preservation, individual profits, profit difference, Pareto-improvement from free-access and sorting of the most efficient users. One of the main findings is that, even though it performs better in sorting out the most efficient subjects, the fee and subsidy scheme is not more profitable than tradable quotas.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: June 2014
Refereed: Yes
JEL Classification: C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
Q28 - Government Policy
Q38 - Government Policy
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 17:38
Last Modified: 17 Apr 2024 06:14
OAI Identifier:

Available Versions of this Item

View Item


Downloads per month over past year