Ambec, Stefan, Garapin, Alexis, Muller, Laurent, Reynaud, Arnaud and Sebi, Carine (2014) Regulatory instruments to protect the commons: An experimental investigation. Environmental and Resource Economics, 58 (2). pp. 219-244.

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Abstract

In a laboratory experiment we test three regulations imposed on a common-pool resource game with heterogeneous users: an access fee and subsidy scheme, transferable quotas and non-transferable quotas. We calibrate the game so that all regulations improve users’ profits compared to free-access extraction. We compare the regulations according to five criteria: resource preservation, individual profits, profit difference, Pareto-improvement from free-access and sorting of the most efficient users. One of the main findings is that, even though it performs better in sorting out the most efficient subjects, the fee and subsidy scheme is not more profitable than tradable quotas.

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• Comparing Regulations to Protect the Commons: An Experimental Investigation. (deposited 18 Jan 2012 06:00)
  • Regulatory instruments to protect the commons: An experimental investigation. (deposited 09 Jul 2014 17:38) [Currently Displayed]