Tools
Tools
Alary, David
, Gollier, Christian and Treich, Nicolas
(2013)
The Effect of Ambiguity Aversion on Insurance and Self-protection.
The Economic Journal, vol. 123 (n° 573).
pp. 1188-1202.
This is the latest version of this item.
Preview |
Text
Download (210kB) | Preview |
Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/27218
Identification Number : 10.1111/ecoj.12035
Abstract
In this paper, we show that ambiguity aversion always raises the demand for self-insurance and the insurance overage, but may decrease the demand for self-protection. We also characterize the optimal insurance design under ambiguity aversion, and exhibit a case in which the straight deductible contract is optimal as in the expected utility model.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | December 2013 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 09 Jul 2014 17:36 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:48 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:27218 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15628 |
Available Versions of this Item
-
The Effect of Ambiguity Aversion on Insurance and Self-protection. (deposited 09 Jul 2014 17:15)
- The Effect of Ambiguity Aversion on Insurance and Self-protection. (deposited 09 Jul 2014 17:36) [Currently Displayed]
