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Brocard, Jean-François
and Cavagnac, Michel
(2012)
Who Should Pay the Sports Agent’s Commission? An Economic Analysis of Setting the Legal Rules in the Regulation of Matchmakers.
TSE Working Paper, n. 13-391, Toulouse
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Abstract
We study the effects of completing the legal framework of matchmakers with a rule designating which party must pay the commission. The paper examines the two rules currently open to debate at the international level in sport: the "player-pays" principle and the "club-pays" principle. We find that the most appropriate measure entails designating the party with the lesser bargaining power to pay the intermediary’s fee. However, our main result indicates that the appropriateness of imposing an additional rule in the legal framework is a preliminary issue. Indeed, even if the best rule is chosen, welfare may be decreased by this legal initiative.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | July 2012 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Sport intermediaries, Matching, Regulation through rules, Legal framework for contracts |
| JEL Classification: | C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 09 Jul 2014 17:35 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:48 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:27145 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15597 |
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