Tools
Tools
Cremer, Helmuth
and De Donder, Philippe
(2013)
Network Investment under Legal and Ownership Unbundling.
Review of Network Economics, vol.12 (n°1).
pp. 27-59.
This is the latest version of this item.
Abstract
We consider an industry where an upstream firm determines the size of a network used by two downstream firms. We contrast ownership unbundling and legal unbundling, where the upstream firm maximizes its total profit, including the profit of its downstream subsidiary(ies), but does not discriminate between them. Furthermore, each downstream subsidiary maximizes its own profit. We show that ownership separation is more detrimental to welfare than legal unbundling, whether the downstream market is perfectly competitive or not, and whether there are asymmetries in network needs across downstream firms, and downstream investments, or not.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | 2013 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Place of Publication: | North Sydney |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 09 Jul 2014 17:34 |
| Last Modified: | 14 Jan 2026 14:24 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:26941 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15540 |
Available Versions of this Item
-
Legal vs Ownership Unbundling in Network Industries. (deposited 18 Jan 2012 05:49)
- Network Investment under Legal and Ownership Unbundling. (deposited 09 Jul 2014 17:34) [Currently Displayed]
