He, Yinghua (2012) Gaming the Boston School Choice Mechanism in Beijing. TSE Working Paper, n. 12-345
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Abstract
The Boston mechanism is criticized for its poor incentive and welfare performance compared
to the Gale-Shapley deferred-acceptance mechanism (DA). Using school choice data
from Beijing, I investigate parents’ behavior under the Boston mechanism, taking into account
parents’ possible mistakes when they strategize. Evidence shows that parents are
overcautious as they play "safe" strategies too often. Wealthier/more educated parents are
less overcautious and perform slightly better because they have better outside options while
not being any more adept at strategizing. Parents who are always truth-telling experience
a utility gain in switching from the Boston mechanism to the DA, equivalent to a 7.1% decrease
in the distance to a school. Among them, 44.2% are better off under the DA, while
35.5% are worse off.
Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
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Date: | May 2012 |
Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
Site: | UT1 |
Date Deposited: | 09 Jul 2014 17:30 |
Last Modified: | 27 Oct 2021 13:36 |
OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:26414 |
URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15423 |