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Garrett, Daniel F. and Pavan, Alessandro (2012) Managerial Turnover in a Changing World. , Toulouse
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Abstract
We develop a dynamic theory of managerial turnover in a world where the quality of the
match between a Örm and its managers changes stochastically over time. Shocks to managerial
productivity are anticipated at the time of contracting but privately observed by the managers.
Our key positive result shows that the Örmís optimal retention decisions become more permissive
with time. Our key normative result shows that, compared to what is e¢ cient, the Örmís contract
either induces excessive retention at all tenure levels, or excessive Öring at the early stages of the
relationship, followed by excessive retention after su¢ ciently long tenure.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | October 2012 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 09 Jul 2014 17:30 |
| Last Modified: | 13 Mar 2021 12:38 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:26405 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15420 |
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