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Le Breton, Michel
, Thomas, Alban and Zaporozhets, Vera
(2012)
Bargaining in River Basin Committees: Rules Versus Discretion.
TSE Working Paper, n. 12-324, Toulouse
Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a game-theoretical non-cooperative model
of bargaining to analyse project funding in the French river basin com-
mittees. After sorting out some of the main theoretical predictions, we
proceed with an empirical application to the subsidy policy of French Wa-
ter Agencies. The theoretical model of bargaining is simulated for various
risk preferences, and a reduced-form estimation of the distribution of sub-
sidies is performed. We find some evidence in support of the predictions
regarding the role of bargaining in decision-making for water management.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | 18 July 2012 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| JEL Classification: | D10 - General D64 - Altruism D91 - Intertemporal Consumer Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving E21 - Macroeconomics - Consumption; Saving; Aggregate Physical and Financial Consumer Wealth |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 09 Jul 2014 17:27 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:47 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:26055 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15354 |
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