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De Donder, Philippe
and Pestieau, Pierre
(2011)
Private, social and self insurance for longterm care: a political economy analysis.
TSE Working Paper, n. 11-305
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Abstract
We study the political determination of the level of social long-term care insurance when voters also choose private insurance and saving amounts. Agents di§er in income, probability of becoming dependent and of receiving family help. Social insurance redistributes across income and risk levels, while private insurance is actuarially fair. The income-to-risk ratio of agents determines whether they prefer social or private insurance. Family support crowds out the demand for both social and, especially, private insurance, as strong prospects of family help drive the demand for private insurance to zero. The availability of private insurance decreases the demand for social insurance but need not decrease its majority chosen level.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | December 2011 |
| Additional Information: | Révisé en juin 2014 |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | long-term care, social insurance, familism, crowding out, weak and strong prospects of family help, voting |
| JEL Classification: | D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes - Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior J14 - Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 09 Jul 2014 17:25 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:47 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:25822 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15282 |
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- Private, social and self insurance for longterm care: a political economy analysis. (deposited 09 Jul 2014 17:25) [Currently Displayed]
