Tools
Tools
Bobtcheff, Catherine and Mariotti, Thomas
(2012)
Potential Competition in Preemption Games.
Games and Economic Behavior, 75 (1).
pp. 53-66.
This is the latest version of this item.
Abstract
We consider a preemption game with two potential competitors who come into play at some random secret times. The presence of a competitor is revealed to a player only when the former moves, which terminates the game. We show that all perfect Bayesian equilibria give rise to the same distribution of players' moving times. Moreover, there exists a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which each player's behavior from any time on is independent of the date at which she came into play. We find that competitive pressure is nonmonotonic over time, and that private information tends to alleviate rent dissipation. Our results have a natural interpretation in terms of eroding reputations.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | May 2012 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| JEL Classification: | C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 09 Jul 2014 17:21 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:47 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:25246 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15169 |
Available Versions of this Item
-
Potential Competition in Preemption Games. (deposited 18 Jan 2012 05:59)
- Potential Competition in Preemption Games. (deposited 09 Jul 2014 17:21) [Currently Displayed]
