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Beccherle, Julien and Tirole, Jean
(2011)
Regional Initiatives and the Cost of Delaying Binding Climate Change Agreements.
Journal of Public Economics, vol. 95 (11-12).
pp. 1339-1348.
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Abstract
The Kyoto and Copenhagen Protocols on climate change mitigation postponed the specification of binding commitments to a future negotiation. This paper analyzes the strategic implications of delayed negotiations. While, as is well-understood, the incentive to free ride leads to excessive emissions prior to a binding agreement, the cost of delay is magnified by players' attempt to secure a favorable bargaining position in the future negotiation. A "brinkmanship", an "effort substitution", and a "raising rival's cost" effects all concur to generate high post-agreement emissions. The paper applies this general insight to the issuance of forward or bankable permits.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | December 2011 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Place of Publication: | Amsterdam |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | International negotiations, climate change, cap and trade, bankable permits |
| JEL Classification: | D62 - Externalities F51 - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions H23 - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies Q52 - Pollution Control Adoption Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 09 Jul 2014 17:19 |
| Last Modified: | 20 Nov 2025 10:11 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:24444 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15132 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Regional Initiatives and the Cost of Delaying Binding Climate Change Agreements. (deposited 18 Jan 2012 06:03)
- Regional Initiatives and the Cost of Delaying Binding Climate Change Agreements. (deposited 09 Jul 2014 17:19) [Currently Displayed]
