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Auriol, Emmanuelle
and Gary-Bobo, Robert J.
(2012)
On the Optimal Number of Representatives.
Public Choice, 153.
pp. 419-445.
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Abstract
We propose a normative theory of the number of representatives based on a model of a representative democracy. We derive a formula giving the number of representatives as proportional to the square root of total population. Simple tests of the formula on a sample of a 100 countries yield good results. We then discuss the appropriateness of the number of representatives in some countries. It seems that the United States has too few representatives, while France and Italy have too many. The excess number of representatives matters: it is positively correlated with indicators of red tape and barriers to entrepreneurship.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | December 2012 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Representative democracy – Number of representatives – Constitution design – Incentives |
| JEL Classification: | D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government H40 - General |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 09 Jul 2014 17:18 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:47 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:24305 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15124 |
Available Versions of this Item
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On the Optimal Number of Representatives. (deposited 18 Jan 2012 05:54)
- On the Optimal Number of Representatives. (deposited 09 Jul 2014 17:18) [Currently Displayed]
