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Shchetinin, Oleg (2009) Contracting under Reciprocal Altruism. TSE Working Paper, n. 09-078
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Abstract
I develop a model of reciprocal altruism which accounts for some evidence in contracting situations, which are paradoxical from the point of view of neoclassical contract theory with selfish actors. My model predicts the crowding-out effect, observed in the Trust Game with the possibility of a fine; for the Control Game the model predicts that an equilibrium can exhibit ”no effect of control”, ”hidden cost of control”, or ”positive effect of control”, depending on the characteristics of the actors, as observed in the experiments. This suggests that reciprocal altruism modeling could be fruitful more generally in applications of contract theory.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | August 2009 |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | contract theory, signaling, behavioral economics |
| JEL Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information M54 - Labor Management (team formation, worker empowerment, job design, tasks and authority, work arrangemetns, job satisfaction) |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 09 Jul 2014 17:07 |
| Last Modified: | 17 Apr 2024 06:30 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:22188 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15015 |
