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Jullien, Bruno
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5919-7835, Salanié, BernardORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7072-5811 and Salanié, FrançoisORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7062-9208
(2007)
Screening Risk-Averse Agents Under Moral Hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case.
Economic Theory, vol. 30 (n° 1).
pp. 151-169.
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Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/8883
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | 5 November 2007 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Place of Publication: | Berlin ; Heidelberg |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 18 Jan 2012 05:47 |
| Last Modified: | 30 Jan 2026 09:49 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:8883 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/1345 |
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Screening Risk-Averse Agents Under Moral Hazard. (deposited 18 Jan 2012 05:47)
- Screening Risk-Averse Agents Under Moral Hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case. (deposited 18 Jan 2012 05:47) [Currently Displayed]
