Garrett, Daniel F. (2020) Payoff implications of incentive contracting. TSE Working Paper, n. 20-1140, Toulouse

Warning
There is a more recent version of this item available.
[thumbnail of wp_tse_1140.pdf]
Preview
Text
Download (547kB) | Preview

Abstract

In the context of a canonical agency model, we study the payo implications of introducing optimally-structured incentives. We do so from the perspective of an analyst who does not know the agent's preferences for responding to incentives, but does knowthat the principal knows them. We provide, in particular, tight bounds on the principal's expected benet from optimal incentive contracting across feasible values of the agent's expected rents. We thus show how economically relevant predictions can be made robustly given ignorance of a key primitive.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: September 2020
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: asymmetric information, mechanism design, robustness, procurement
JEL Classification: D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Sep 2020 13:46
Last Modified: 27 May 2021 07:55
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:124664
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/41778

Available Versions of this Item

View Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year