Payoff Implications of Incentive Contracting

Garrett, Daniel F. (2020) Payoff Implications of Incentive Contracting. TSE Working Paper, n. 20-1140, Toulouse

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Abstract

In the context of a canonical agency model, we study the payo implications of introducing optimally-structured incentives. We do so from the perspective of an analyst
who does not know the agent's preferences for responding to incentives, but does knowthat the principal knows them. We provide, in particular, tight bounds on the principal's expected benet from optimal incentive contracting across feasible values of the
agent's expected rents. We thus show how economically relevant predictions can be made robustly given ignorance of a key primitive.

Item Type:	Monograph (Working Paper)
Language:	English
Date:	September 2020
Place of Publication:	Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords:	asymmetric information, mechanism design, robustness, procurement
JEL Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Subjects:	B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions:	TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution:	Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site:	UT1
Date Deposited:	09 Sep 2020 13:46
Last Modified:	09 Sep 2020 13:46
OAI Identifier:	oai:tse-fr.eu:124664
URI:	http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/41778

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