Increase the visibility of your scientific production by authorizing the export of your publications to HAL!

Collusion between two-sided platforms

Lefouili, Yassine and Pinho, Joana (2020) Collusion between two-sided platforms. International Journal of Industrial Organization. (In Press)

This is the latest version of this item.

[img]
Preview
Text
Download (792kB) | Preview
Official URL: https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/docu...

Abstract

We study the price and welfare effects of collusion between two-sided platforms and
show that they depend on whether collusion occurs on both sides or a single side of the market,
and whether users single-home or multi-home. Our most striking result is that one-sided collusion leads to lower (resp. higher) prices on the collusive (resp. competitive) side if the cross-group externalities exerted on the collusive side are positive and sufficiently strong. One-sided collusion may, therefore, benefit the users on the collusive side and harm the users on the competitive side. Our findings have implications regarding cartel detection and damages actions.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: 2020
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: Collusion, Two-sided markets, Cross-group externalities
JEL Classification: D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 28 Jul 2020 09:34
Last Modified: 28 Jul 2020 09:34
["eprint_fieldname_oai_identifier" not defined]: oai:tse-fr.eu:124476
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/41720

Available Versions of this Item

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year