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Strategic, Sincere and Heuristic Voting under Four Election Rules: An Experimental Study

Blais, André, Laslier, Jean-François, Sauger, Nicolas and Van Der Straeten, Karine (2010) Strategic, Sincere and Heuristic Voting under Four Election Rules: An Experimental Study. Social Choice and Welfare, 35 (n°3). pp. 435-472.

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/22415

Abstract

We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked preferences, we find that the rational choice theory provides very good predictions of actual individual behavior in one-round and approval voting elections but fares poorly in explaining vote choice under two-round elections. We conclude that voters behave strategically as far as strategic computations are not too demanding, in which case they rely on simple heuristics (under two-round voting) or they just vote sincerely (under single transferable vote).

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: March 2010
Refereed: Yes
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 18 Jan 2012 06:02
Last Modified: 02 Oct 2019 23:01
["eprint_fieldname_oai_identifier" not defined]: oai:tse-fr.eu:22415
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/3455

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