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Taxes and Turnout

Bierbrauer, Felix, Tsyvinski, Aleh and Werquin, Nicolas (2019) Taxes and Turnout. TSE Working Paper, n. 19-1050, Toulouse

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Abstract

We develop a model of political competition with endogenous platform choices of parties and endogenous turnout. A main finding is that a party that is leading in the polls has an incentive to cater primarily to the core voters of the opposing party. A party that is lagging behind, by contrast, has an incentive to cater to its own base. We analyze the implications for redistributive taxation and characterize the political weights that competing parties assign to voters with different incomes. Finally, we relate the comparative statics predictions of our model to the asymmetric demobilization strategy in the German elections in the era of Merkel.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: November 2019
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: Political competition, Income Taxation, Turnout
JEL Classification: D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes - Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 20 Nov 2019 12:15
Last Modified: 12 Feb 2020 14:10
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:123701
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/32924

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