Collective Action, Group Size and Complementarities in Efforts

Cheikbossian, Guillaume and Fayat, Romain (2018) Collective Action, Group Size and Complementarities in Efforts. Economics Letters, 168. pp. 77-81.

This is the latest version of this item.

[img]
Preview
Text
Download (262kB) | Preview
Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/32676

Abstract

We revisit the group size paradox in a model where two groups of different sizes compete for a prize exhibiting a varying degree of rivalry and where group effort is given by a CES function of individual e¤orts. We show that the larger group can be more successful than the smaller group if the degree of complementarity is sufficiently high relative to the degree of rivalry of the prize.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: July 2018
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: group size paradox, group contest, complementarity, (impure) public good
JEL codes: D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes - Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 23 May 2018 06:28
Last Modified: 24 Jul 2019 11:36
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:32676
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/26023

Available Versions of this Item

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year