Price Caps as Welfare-Enhancing Coopetition

Rey, Patrick and Tirole, Jean (2013) Price Caps as Welfare-Enhancing Coopetition. TSE Working Paper, n. 13-439, Toulouse

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The paper makes two related contributions. First, and in contrast
with the rich body of literature on collusion with (mainly perfect)
substitutes, it derives general results on the sustainability of tacit
coordination for a class of nested demand functions that allows for
the full range between perfect substitutes and perfect complements.
Second, it studies the desirability of joint marketing alliances, an
alternative to mergers. It shows that a combination of two informationfree
regulatory requirements, mandated unbundling by the joint marketing
entity and unfettered independent marketing by the firms, makes
joint-marketing alliances always socially desirable, whether tacit coordination
is feasible or not.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: 23 October 2013
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: tacit collusion, cooperation, substitutes and complements, essentiality, joint marketing agreements, patent pools, independent licensing, unbundling, co-opetition
JEL Classification: D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L24 - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures; Technology Licensing
L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
O34 - Intellectual Property Rights - National and International Issues
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 17:39
Last Modified: 23 Jul 2018 12:50
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