Gaming the Boston School Choice Mechanism in Beijing

He, Yinghua (2012) Gaming the Boston School Choice Mechanism in Beijing. TSE Working Paper, n. 12-345

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/26414

Abstract

The Boston mechanism is criticized for its poor incentive and welfare performance compared
to the Gale-Shapley deferred-acceptance mechanism (DA). Using school choice data
from Beijing, I investigate parents’ behavior under the Boston mechanism, taking into account
parents’ possible mistakes when they strategize. Evidence shows that parents are
overcautious as they play "safe" strategies too often. Wealthier/more educated parents are
less overcautious and perform slightly better because they have better outside options while
not being any more adept at strategizing. Parents who are always truth-telling experience
a utility gain in switching from the Boston mechanism to the DA, equivalent to a 7.1% decrease
in the distance to a school. Among them, 44.2% are better off under the DA, while
35.5% are worse off.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Date: May 2012
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 17:30
Last Modified: 07 Mar 2018 13:22
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:26414
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15423

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