Bargaining in River Basin Committees: Rules Versus Discretion

Le Breton, Michel, Thomas, Alban and Zaporozhets, Vera (2012) Bargaining in River Basin Committees: Rules Versus Discretion. TSE Working Paper, n. 12-324, Toulouse

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/26055


In this paper, we introduce a game-theoretical non-cooperative model
of bargaining to analyse project funding in the French river basin com-
mittees. After sorting out some of the main theoretical predictions, we
proceed with an empirical application to the subsidy policy of French Wa-
ter Agencies. The theoretical model of bargaining is simulated for various
risk preferences, and a reduced-form estimation of the distribution of sub-
sidies is performed. We find some evidence in support of the predictions
regarding the role of bargaining in decision-making for water management.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: 18 July 2012
Place of Publication: Toulouse
JEL codes: D10 - General
D64 - Altruism
D91 - Intertemporal Consumer Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving
E21 - Macroeconomics - Consumption; Saving; Aggregate Physical and Financial Consumer Wealth
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 17:27
Last Modified: 20 Mar 2018 13:59
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:26055
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15354

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