Private, social and self insurance for longterm care: a political economy analysis

De Donder, Philippe and Pestieau, Pierre (2011) Private, social and self insurance for longterm care: a political economy analysis. TSE Working Paper, n. 11-305

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/25822


We study the political determination of the level of social long-term care insurance when voters also choose private insurance and saving amounts. Agents di§er in income, probability of becoming dependent and of receiving family help. Social insurance redistributes across income and risk levels, while private insurance is actuarially fair. The income-to-risk ratio of agents determines whether they prefer social or private insurance. Family support crowds out the demand for both social and, especially, private insurance, as strong prospects of family help drive the demand for private insurance to zero. The availability of private insurance decreases the demand for social insurance but need not decrease its majority chosen level.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: December 2011
Additional Information: Révisé en juin 2014
Uncontrolled Keywords: long-term care, social insurance, familism, crowding out, weak and strong prospects of family help, voting
JEL Classification: D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes - Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
J14 - Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 17:25
Last Modified: 07 Mar 2018 13:22
["eprint_fieldname_oai_identifier" not defined]: oai:tse-fr.eu:25822
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15282

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