Regional Initiatives and the Cost of Delaying Binding Climate Change Agreements

Beccherle, Julien and Tirole, Jean (2011) Regional Initiatives and the Cost of Delaying Binding Climate Change Agreements. Journal of Public Economics, vol. 95. pp. 1339-1348.

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/24444

Abstract

The Kyoto and Copenhagen Protocols on climate change mitigation postponed the specification of binding commitments to a future negotiation. This paper analyzes the strategic implications of delayed negotiations. While, as is well-understood, the incentive to free ride leads to excessive emissions prior to a binding agreement, the cost of delay is magnified by players' attempt to secure a favorable bargaining position in the future negotiation. A "brinkmanship", an "effort substitution", and a "raising rival's cost" effects all concur to generate high post-agreement emissions. The paper applies this general insight to the issuance of forward or bankable permits.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: December 2011
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: International negotiations, climate change, cap and trade, bankable permits
JEL codes: D62 - Externalities
F51 - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
H23 - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Q52 - Pollution Control Adoption Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 17:19
Last Modified: 07 Mar 2018 13:22
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:24444
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15132

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