Beccherle, Julien and Tirole, Jean (2011) Regional Initiatives and the Cost of Delaying Binding Climate Change Agreements. Journal of Public Economics, vol. 95. pp. 1339-1348.

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Identification Number : 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.04.007

Abstract

The Kyoto and Copenhagen Protocols on climate change mitigation postponed the specification of binding commitments to a future negotiation. This paper analyzes the strategic implications of delayed negotiations. While, as is well-understood, the incentive to free ride leads to excessive emissions prior to a binding agreement, the cost of delay is magnified by players' attempt to secure a favorable bargaining position in the future negotiation. A "brinkmanship", an "effort substitution", and a "raising rival's cost" effects all concur to generate high post-agreement emissions. The paper applies this general insight to the issuance of forward or bankable permits.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: December 2011
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: International negotiations, climate change, cap and trade, bankable permits
JEL Classification: D62 - Externalities
F51 - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
H23 - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Q52 - Pollution Control Adoption Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 17:19
Last Modified: 02 Apr 2021 15:47
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:24444
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15132

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