Contracting under Reciprocal Altruism

Shchetinin, Oleg (2009) Contracting under Reciprocal Altruism. TSE Working Paper, n. 09-078

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/22188

Abstract

I develop a model of reciprocal altruism which accounts for some evidence in contracting situations, which are paradoxical from the point of view of neoclassical contract theory with selfish actors. My model predicts the crowding-out effect, observed in the Trust Game with the possibility of a fine; for the Control Game the model predicts that an equilibrium can exhibit ”no effect of control”, ”hidden cost of control”, or ”positive effect of control”, depending on the characteristics of the actors, as observed in the experiments. This suggests that reciprocal altruism modeling could be fruitful more generally in applications of contract theory.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: August 2009
Uncontrolled Keywords: contract theory, signaling, behavioral economics
JEL codes: D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
M54 - Labor Management (team formation, worker empowerment, job design, tasks and authority, work arrangemetns, job satisfaction)
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 17:07
Last Modified: 07 Mar 2018 13:22
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:22188
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15015

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