Koessler, Frédéric, Laclau, Marie, Renault, Jérôme and Tomala, Tristan (2022) Long information design. Theoretical Economics, vol.17 (n°2). pp. 883-927.

Garrett, Daniel F. (2021) Payoff implications of incentive contracting. Theoretical Economics, vol. 16 (n° 4). pp. 1281-1312.

Bianchi, Milo and Jehiel, Philippe (2020) Bundlers Dilemmas in Financial Markets with Sampling Investors. Theoretical Economics, vol. 15 (n° 2). pp. 545-582.

Kojima, Fuhito and Yamashita, Takuro (2017) Double auction with interdependent values: incentives and efficiency. Theoretical Economics, 12 (n°3). pp. 1393-1438.

Gomes, Renato and Pavan, Alessandro (2016) Many-to-many matching and price discrimination. Theoretical Economics, 11 (3). pp. 1005-1052.

Ulbricht, Robert (2016) Optimal Delegated Search with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard. Theoretical Economics, 11 (1). pp. 253-278.

Attar, Andrea, Mariotti, Thomas and Salanié, François (2014) Nonexclusive Competition under Adverse Selection. Theoretical Economics, 9 (1). pp. 1-40.

Gerardi, Dino and Maestri, Lucas (2012) A Principal-Agent Model of Sequential Testing. Theoretical Economics, 7 (3).

Martimort, David and Moreira, Humberto (2010) Common Agency and Public Good Provision under Asymmetric Information. Theoretical Economics, 5 (2). pp. 159-213.