Berardi, Nicoletta and Seabright, PaulORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3725-3098 (2020) Joint Ownership of Production Projects as a Commitment Device against Interest Groups. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 176 (3). pp. 572-594.

Cheikbossian, Guillaume and Mahenc, Philippe (2018) On the Difficulty of Collusion in the Presence of a More Efficient Outsider. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 174 (4). pp. 595-628.

Cavagnac, Michel and Cheikbossian, Guillaume (2015) Trade Policy, Mergers, and Product Differentiation. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 171 (2). pp. 330-354.

Baik, Kyung Hwan and Kim, Jihyun (2014) Contests with Bilateral Delegation: Unobservable Contracts. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 170 (3). pp. 387-405.

Guembel, AlexanderORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1947-3647 (2005) Trading on Short-Term Information. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 161 (3). pp. 428-452.

Laffont, Jean-Jacques and N'Guessan, Tchétché (2001) Group Contracting and Enforcement. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 157 (4). pp. 487-498.

Feess, Eberhard and Hege, UlrichORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4625-5212 (1998) Efficient Liability Rules for Multi-Party Accidents with Moral Hazard. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 154 (2). pp. 422-450.