Berardi, Nicoletta and Seabright, Paul
 and Seabright, Paul (2020)
Joint Ownership of Production Projects as a Commitment Device against Interest Groups.
  
    Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 176 (3).
     pp. 572-594.
  
(2020)
Joint Ownership of Production Projects as a Commitment Device against Interest Groups.
  
    Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 176 (3).
     pp. 572-594.
  	
  
  
    Cheikbossian, Guillaume and Mahenc, Philippe
 and Mahenc, Philippe (2018)
On the Difficulty of Collusion in the Presence of a More Efficient Outsider.
  
    Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 174 (4).
     pp. 595-628.
  
(2018)
On the Difficulty of Collusion in the Presence of a More Efficient Outsider.
  
    Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 174 (4).
     pp. 595-628.
  	
  
  
    Cavagnac, Michel and Cheikbossian, Guillaume
 and Cheikbossian, Guillaume (2015)
Trade Policy, Mergers, and Product Differentiation.
  
    Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 171 (2).
     pp. 330-354.
  
(2015)
Trade Policy, Mergers, and Product Differentiation.
  
    Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 171 (2).
     pp. 330-354.
  	
  
  
    Baik, Kyung Hwan and Kim, Jihyun (2014)
Contests with Bilateral Delegation: Unobservable Contracts.
  
    Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 170 (3).
     pp. 387-405.
  
(2014)
Contests with Bilateral Delegation: Unobservable Contracts.
  
    Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 170 (3).
     pp. 387-405.
  	
  
  
    Guembel, Alexander (2005)
Trading on Short-Term Information.
  
    Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 161 (3).
     pp. 428-452.
  
(2005)
Trading on Short-Term Information.
  
    Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 161 (3).
     pp. 428-452.
  	
  
  
    Laffont, Jean-Jacques and N'Guessan, Tchétché
 and N'Guessan, Tchétché (2001)
Group Contracting and Enforcement.
  
    Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 157 (4).
     pp. 487-498.
  
(2001)
Group Contracting and Enforcement.
  
    Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 157 (4).
     pp. 487-498.
  	
  
  
    Feess, Eberhard and Hege, Ulrich
 and Hege, Ulrich (1998)
Efficient Liability Rules for Multi-Party Accidents with Moral Hazard.
  
    Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 154 (2).
     pp. 422-450.
  
(1998)
Efficient Liability Rules for Multi-Party Accidents with Moral Hazard.
  
    Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 154 (2).
     pp. 422-450.
  	
  
  
 
  
                         
                        



![[up]](/style/images/multi_up.png) Up a level
 Up a level