Number of items: 9.

Gagnepain, Philippe and Martimort, David (2025) Collusion in bidding markets: The case of the French public transport industry. International Review of Law and Economics, vol. 84 (n° 106304).

Chen, Daniel L.IdRef and Reinhart, Eric (2024) The Disavowal of Decisionism in American Law: Political Motivation in the Judiciary. International Review of Law and Economics, vol. 20 (n° 2). pp. 289-321.

Chen, Daniel L.IdRef (2023) Judicial compliance in district courts. International Review of Law and Economics, vol.74.

Bonnet, CélineIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2722-5344 and Bouamra-Mechemache, ZohraIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6977-4619 (2020) Empirical methodology for the evaluation of collusive behaviour in vertically-related markets: an application to the "yogurt cartel" in France. International Review of Law and Economics, vol. 61 (105872).

Philippe, ArnaudIdRef (2017) Does introducing lay people in criminal courts affect judicial decisions?: Evidence from French reform. International Review of Law and Economics, 52. pp. 1-15.

Auriol, EmmanuelleIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2261-8736 and Søreide, TinaIdRef (2017) An Economic Analysis of Debarment. International Review of Law and Economics, vol. 50. pp. 36-49.

Allain, Marie-LaureIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9065-2237, Boyer, MarcelIdRef, Kotchoni, Rachidi and Ponssard, Jean-PierreIdRef (2015) Are cartel fines optimal? Theory and evidence from the European Union. International Review of Law and Economics, 42. pp. 38-47.

Feess, EberhardIdRef and Hege, UlrichIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4625-5212 (2003) Safety Monitoring, Capital Structure and Financial Responsibility. International Review of Law and Economics, 23 (3). pp. 323-339.

Feess, EberhardIdRef and Hege, UlrichIdRefORCIDORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4625-5212 (1999) The Role of Insurance in the Adjudication of Multi-Party Accidents. International Review of Law and Economics, 19 (1). pp. 69-85.

This list was generated on Thu Mar 26 02:54:46 2026 CET.