Group by: Item Type | Date | No Grouping
Number of items: 10.

Chiappori, Pierre-AndréIdRef, Gandhi, Amit, Salanié, BernardIdRef and Salanié, FrançoisIdRef (2012) From Aggregate Betting Data to Individual Risk Preferences. LERNA Working Paper, n. 13.14.401

Chiappori, Pierre-AndréIdRef, Jullien, BrunoIdRef, Salanié, BernardIdRef and Salanié, FrançoisIdRef (2006) Asymmetric Information in Insurance: Some Testable Implications. The RAND Journal of Economics, 37 (4). pp. 783-798.

Chiappori, Pierre-AndréIdRef, Jullien, BrunoIdRef, Salanié, BernardIdRef and Salanié, FrançoisIdRef (2006) Asymmetric Information in Insurance: General Testable Implications. RAND Journal of Economics, 37 (4). pp. 783-798.

Jullien, BrunoIdRef and Salanié, BernardIdRef (2005) Empirical Evidence on the Preferences of Racetrack Bettors. IDEI Working Paper, n. 178

Jullien, BrunoIdRef, Salanié, BernardIdRef and Salanié, FrançoisIdRef (2001) Screening Risk-Averse Agents Under Moral Hazard. IDEI Working Paper, n. 131

Jullien, BrunoIdRef and Salanié, BernardIdRef (2000) Estimating Preferences under Risk: The Case of Racetrack Bettors. Journal of Political Economy, 108. pp. 503-530.

Jullien, BrunoIdRef, Salanié, BernardIdRef and Salanié, FrançoisIdRef (1999) Should More Risk-Averse Agents Exert More Effort ? Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, 24 (1). pp. 19-28.

Rey, PatrickIdRef and Salanié, BernardIdRef (1996) Long-Term, Short-term and Renegotiation: On the Value of Commitment with Asymmetric Information. Econometrica, 64 (6). pp. 1395-1414.

Chiappori, Pierre-AndréIdRef, Macho-Stadler, InésIdRef, Rey, PatrickIdRef and Salanié, BernardIdRef (1994) Repeated Moral Hazard : The Role of Memory, Commitment, and the Access to Credit Markets. European Economic Review, 38 (n°8). pp. 1227-1253.

Rey, PatrickIdRef and Salanié, BernardIdRef (1990) Long-Term, Short-term and Renegotiation: On the value of Commitment in Contracting. Econometrica, 58 (3). pp. 597-619.

This list was generated on Tue Jan 13 20:10:17 2026 CET.