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Besfamille, Martin and Lozachmeur, Jean-MarieORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0005-7030-9470 (2010) Nimby and Mechanism Design under Different Constitutional Constraints. International Tax and Public Finance, 17 (2). pp. 114-132.

Besfamille, Martin, De Donder, PhilippeORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4159-3263 and Lozachmeur, Jean-MarieORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0005-7030-9470 (2010) The political economy of the weak enforcement of sales tax. CEPR Discussion Paper, n. 7108

Besfamille, Martin, De Donder, PhilippeORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4159-3263 and Lozachmeur, Jean-MarieORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0005-7030-9470 (2009) A Theory of Political Support for Low Sales Tax Enforcement. CEPR Discussion Paper, n. 7108

Besfamille, Martin, De Donder, PhilippeORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4159-3263 and Lozachmeur, Jean-MarieORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0005-7030-9470 (2009) Tax Enforcement may Decrease Government Revenue. Economics Bulletin, 29 (4). pp. 2669-2676.