Bobba, Matteo, Ederer, Tim, Leon-Ciliotta, Gianmarco, Neilson, Christopher and Nieddu, Marco (2026) Signal Extraction in Centralized Assignment : Evidence from Teacher Recruiting. TSE Working Paper, n. 26-1803, Toulouse

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Abstract

We study the design of decentralized signal extraction in centralized assignment. Using data on Peru’s nationwide teacher allocation mechanism, we estimate a rich model of applicants’ behavior, teacher effectiveness and schools’ discretionary screening accounting for heterogeneity in schools’ preferences and signal-extraction ability. Decentralized screening improves the effectiveness of selected teachers on average relative to test-based hiring, but its returns vary substantially across schools. We find that efficiently allocating screening capacity according to schools’ signal extraction ability is unfeasible. Instead, we show that using teacher value-added measures for centralized prescreening can generate large gains and outperforms disclosing that information directly to schools. However, prescreening too aggressively leaves more vacancies unfilled as schools increasingly compete for the same candidates.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: 13 November 2026
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 20 Nov 2026 09:20
Last Modified: 20 Nov 2026 09:20
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:132357
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/54196
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