Bobba, Matteo
, Ederer, Tim
, Leon-Ciliotta, Gianmarco, Neilson, Christopher and Nieddu, Marco
(2026)
Signal Extraction in Centralized Assignment : Evidence from Teacher Recruiting.
TSE Working Paper, n. 26-1803, Toulouse
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Abstract
We study the design of decentralized signal extraction in centralized assignment. Using data on Peru’s nationwide teacher allocation mechanism, we estimate a rich model of applicants’ behavior, teacher effectiveness and schools’ discretionary screening accounting for heterogeneity in schools’ preferences and signal-extraction ability. Decentralized screening improves the effectiveness of selected teachers on average relative to test-based hiring, but its returns vary substantially across schools. We find that efficiently allocating screening capacity according to schools’ signal extraction ability is unfeasible. Instead, we show that using teacher value-added measures for centralized prescreening can generate large gains and outperforms disclosing that information directly to schools. However, prescreening too aggressively leaves more vacancies unfilled as schools increasingly compete for the same candidates.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | 13 November 2026 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 20 Nov 2026 09:20 |
| Last Modified: | 20 Nov 2026 09:20 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:132357 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/54196 |

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