Lukyanov, Georgy, Vlasova, Anna and Ziskelevich, Maria (2026) Paying for Failure in Expert Advice. TSE Working Paper, n. 26-1802, Toulouse

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Abstract

A failed recommendation is visible; an unproposed project is not. How should an
organization pay an adviser whose private confidence determines which projects reach
the margin? We show that the least-cost instrument is protection after failure rather
than a success bonus. Because risky advice selects the upper tail of confidence, success
pay leaks to recommendations that would occur anyway, while failure protection is
concentrated at the margin. We establish unique nonpooling implementation, show
that full correction is never optimal, and, while advice still needs encouragement, find
confidential internal review substitutes for explicit career insurance more effectively
than transparent review.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: October 2026
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: career concerns, expert advice, project selection, outcome-contingent compensation, failure tolerance, internal review
JEL Classification: D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs, seniority issues)
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 20 Nov 2026 08:41
Last Modified: 20 Nov 2026 08:41
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:132350
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/54194
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