Lukyanov, Georgy
, Vlasova, Anna and Ziskelevich, Maria
(2026)
Paying for Failure in Expert Advice.
TSE Working Paper, n. 26-1802, Toulouse
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Abstract
A failed recommendation is visible; an unproposed project is not. How should an
organization pay an adviser whose private confidence determines which projects reach
the margin? We show that the least-cost instrument is protection after failure rather
than a success bonus. Because risky advice selects the upper tail of confidence, success
pay leaks to recommendations that would occur anyway, while failure protection is
concentrated at the margin. We establish unique nonpooling implementation, show
that full correction is never optimal, and, while advice still needs encouragement, find
confidential internal review substitutes for explicit career insurance more effectively
than transparent review.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | October 2026 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | career concerns, expert advice, project selection, outcome-contingent compensation, failure tolerance, internal review |
| JEL Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs, seniority issues) |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 20 Nov 2026 08:41 |
| Last Modified: | 20 Nov 2026 08:41 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:132350 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/54194 |

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