Lukyanov, Georgy
(2026)
Designing Silence : Peer Feedback under Reputational Concerns.
TSE Working Paper, n. 26-1800, Toulouse
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Abstract
How should an organization control what its experts learn from one another between a first
opinion and a final one? We study a platform that collects two independent binary forecasts
and decides whether the second expert may see the first expert’s lodged report before revising,
when experts are rewarded for reputation rather than accuracy. The platform commits to a
reveal-or-silence lottery conditioned on whether the lodged reports agree. Because non-revelation
is informative, silence becomes an instrument of design rather than the absence of one. Our
main result is a concealment-ray theorem: along policy rays that hold fixed the composition of
the silent pool, the value of every finite downstream decision problem and every locked-report
incentive slack is affine. A two-dimensional design problem therefore collapses to full disclosure
and two one-dimensional boundaries. At an exact rational profile, a computer-assisted certificate
identifies the unique state-classification optimum within the maintained class: disagreement is
never revealed, while approximately 71.08 percent of agreements are revealed—just enough to
make silence unfavourable news and eliminate a low-ability expert’s tendency to stand by a stale
forecast. The policy strictly outperforms both sealing and full disclosure, although the gain over
full disclosure is modest, and remains uniquely optimal after recalibrating the threshold on an
open set of nearby primitives. Two qualifications delimit its reach. Sealing and full disclosure are
Blackwell incomparable, so no protocol is best for every downstream objective. Moreover, every
policy admits an uninformative equilibrium, so the comparison is conducted within a maintained
regular-monotone class.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | October 2026 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | economic design, peer feedback, selective disclosure, career concerns, information aggregation |
| JEL Classification: | C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 20 Nov 2026 08:26 |
| Last Modified: | 20 Nov 2026 08:26 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:132346 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/54192 |

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