Martimort, David
and Pouyet, Jérôme
(2026)
Exclusive Dealing Without Exclusivity : Screening Contracts, Loyalty Rebates, and the Limits of Antitrust Tests.
Competition Policy International, Antitrust.
|
Text
Restricted Registered users only until 25 October 2027. Download (3MB) |
Abstract
Dominant suppliers do not often ask customers to sign an explicit exclusivity clause. They can achieve much the same result through prices, loyalty rebates, market-share discounts, all-unit discounts, or minimum purchase requirements. These practices are now commonly assessed through the As-Efficient-Competitor (“AEC”) test. We study them in a model in which a dominant seller screens a buyer who knows both the strength of its demand and the gains from trading with a capacity-constrained rival. The analysis yields a mixed verdict. The traditional suspicion of rebates conditioned on rival sourcing is justified: these con¬tracts tax the rival's efficiency, discourage efficient entry, and fail the AEC test. Yet removing the condition does not remove the underlying incentive. An optimal unconditional tariff can recreate both the shape and the effects of an all-unit discount. More fundamentally, the usual tests rely on an inappropriate benchmark. Relative to the relevant counterfactual, a lawful discriminating monopolist, their verdicts need not track total welfare and may even protect socially excessive entry.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | 25 October 2026 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Place of Publication: | Chicago |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 06 Nov 2026 08:46 |
| Last Modified: | 06 Nov 2026 08:46 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:132333 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/54187 |

Tools
Tools
