Lukyanov, Georgy
, Shamruk, Konstantin
, Su, Tong
and Wakrim, Ahmed
(2022)
Public communication with externalities.
Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 136.
pp. 177-196.
Abstract
This paper develops a model in which a sender strategically communicates with a group of receivers whose payoffs depend on the sender's information. It is shown that aggregate payoff externalities create an endogenous conflict of interests between the sender and the receivers, rendering full information revelation, in general infeasible. We demonstrate that an exogenous bias in the sender's preferences can improve public information provision and raise welfare. Two applications of the setup are discussed.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | November 2022 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Place of Publication: | New York |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Public information, Optimal bias, Externalities, Communication |
| JEL Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | other |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 30 Oct 2026 09:18 |
| Last Modified: | 30 Oct 2026 09:18 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:132320 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/54173 |

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