Lukyanov, Georgy, Shamruk, Konstantin, Su, Tong and Wakrim, Ahmed (2022) Public communication with externalities. Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 136. pp. 177-196.

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Identification Number : 10.1016/j.geb.2022.09.003

Abstract

This paper develops a model in which a sender strategically communicates with a group of receivers whose payoffs depend on the sender's information. It is shown that aggregate payoff externalities create an endogenous conflict of interests between the sender and the receivers, rendering full information revelation, in general infeasible. We demonstrate that an exogenous bias in the sender's preferences can improve public information provision and raise welfare. Two applications of the setup are discussed.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: November 2022
Refereed: Yes
Place of Publication: New York
Uncontrolled Keywords: Public information, Optimal bias, Externalities, Communication
JEL Classification: C72 - Noncooperative Games
D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: other
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 30 Oct 2026 09:18
Last Modified: 30 Oct 2026 09:18
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:132320
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/54173
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