Lukyanov, Georgy (2023) Collateral and reputation in a model of strategic defaults. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, vol. 156.

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Identification Number : 10.1016/j.jedc.2023.104755

Abstract

This paper builds a finite-horizon model to study the role of physical collateral in a model of strategic defaults, when the borrower can develop reputation for honesty. Asset ownership increases attractiveness of the reputational channel: the borrower who would prefer to remain in autarky in the absence of the asset prefers to apply for collateralized debt. Pledging the asset as collateral facilitates reputation building, which is especially successful at the times of asset price drops, because these are the times when default is most tempting. The complementarity between secured and unsecured lending is especially pronounced when the ratio of the borrower's financial to non-financial income is neither too large nor too small.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: November 2023
Refereed: Yes
Place of Publication: Amsterdam
Uncontrolled Keywords: Reputation, Default, Collateral
JEL Classification: G33 - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
K35 - Personal Bankruptcy Law
L14 - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: other
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 30 Oct 2026 08:32
Last Modified: 30 Oct 2026 08:32
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:132318
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/54171
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