Lukyanov, Georgy
(2025)
The welfare effects of policy signalling in a regime change game.
Economic Theory Bulletin, vol. 13 (n° 2).
pp. 291-303.
Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/132316
Identification Number : 10.1007/s40505-025-00295-z
Abstract
We explore a specific parametric example of a regime change game in which a policymaker defends the status quo against a continuum of atomistic agents who seek to overthrow it. At the start of the game, the policymaker can initiate a policy intervention to make an attack less appealing. When agents’ private information is relatively imprecise, signalling is beneficial to the policymaker when the fundamentals are strong but detrimental when the fundamentals are weak.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | 17 June 2025 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Global games, Signalling, Policymaker, Regime change |
| JEL Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information D84 - Expectations; Speculations E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies F31 - Foreign Exchange |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 30 Oct 2026 08:24 |
| Last Modified: | 30 Oct 2026 08:24 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:132316 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/54169 |

Tools
Tools
