Lukyanov, Georgy (2025) The welfare effects of policy signalling in a regime change game. Economic Theory Bulletin, vol. 13 (n° 2). pp. 291-303.

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Identification Number : 10.1007/s40505-025-00295-z

Abstract

We explore a specific parametric example of a regime change game in which a policymaker defends the status quo against a continuum of atomistic agents who seek to overthrow it. At the start of the game, the policymaker can initiate a policy intervention to make an attack less appealing. When agents’ private information is relatively imprecise, signalling is beneficial to the policymaker when the fundamentals are strong but detrimental when the fundamentals are weak.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: 17 June 2025
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: Global games, Signalling, Policymaker, Regime change
JEL Classification: D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
D84 - Expectations; Speculations
E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies
F31 - Foreign Exchange
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 30 Oct 2026 08:24
Last Modified: 30 Oct 2026 08:24
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:132316
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/54169
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