Li, David and Lukyanov, Georgy (2026) Honesty, Stigma, and Cooperation in an Overlapping-Generations Game. Theory and Decision.

This is the latest version of this item.

Full text not available from this repository.
Identification Number : 10.1007/s11238-026-10157-0

Abstract

We study a two-period overlapping-generations game in which a young agent interacts with an old agent and carries a binary record into old age. Honest agents cooperate with clear partners, whereas strategic agents have a privately known loss from being exploited. A clear record is informative: honest agents remain clear, while some strategic agents acquire stigma. We incorporate this selection into Bayes-consistent stationary equilibrium beliefs. With uniformly distributed losses, strategic young agents use a cutoff rule and equilibrium reduces to a quadratic equation. A simple parameter region has a unique equilibrium; when the temptation to defect is high, low- and high-cooperation corner equilibria coexist with an interior tipping equilibrium. Along that interior branch, a larger honest share lowers both the strategic cutoff and the young cooperation rate. The branch is locally unstable, however, so the result describes a moving coordination threshold rather than a deterioration of stable equilibrium selection. Under a maximin decision rule, strategic cooperation disappears. Probabilistic record clearing weakens incentives at every fixed conjecture, reduces cooperation at locally stable interior equilibria, and under full clearing leaves only defection by strategic agents.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: 19 August 2026
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: Overlapping generations, Reputation, Community enforcement, Prisoner’s Dilemma, Stigma, Honest types
JEL Classification: C72 - Noncooperative Games
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 27 Oct 2026 14:44
Last Modified: 27 Oct 2026 14:46
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:132315
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/54168

Available Versions of this Item

View Item