Lukyanov, Georgy and Ly, Hengrina (2026) The Fiscal Alibi : Hidden Spending Needs and Government Reputation. TSE Working Paper, n. 26-1796, Toulouse

[thumbnail of wp_tse_1796.pdf]
Preview
Text
Download (1MB) | Preview

Abstract

A government may ask for a high tax because it faces a genuine expense. The same demand can also be made by a government that intends to keep the proceeds. We study this ambiguity in a two-period reputation model with privately observed spending needs and an endogenous tax base. The opportunist chooses between outright confiscation and levies that an honest government might impose. We characterize the three possible regimes through a single equilibrium equation. A mean-preserving spread of legitimate needs weakly raises the opportunist’s lifetime value, with a strict increase precisely when the spread changes the upper tail relevant for mimicry. We then give a necessary and sufficient curvature condition for this ordering to extend to a general reputational continuation prize. Verification reduces the value of concealment, but also changes how the opportunist extracts. In the benchmark economy, greater auditing weakly lowers current citizen welfare, even before audit costs, while improving the future allocation through better information. The welfare case for verification consequently depends on the balance between these two effects. Examples yield no auditing, an optimum within a regime, and an optimum at the boundary between regimes.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: October 2026
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: government reputation, hidden fiscal needs, taxation, convex order, audits, political agency
JEL Classification: D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
H61 - Budget; Budget Systems
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 23 Oct 2026 08:15
Last Modified: 23 Oct 2026 08:15
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:132310
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/54163
View Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year