Salant, David J.
, Cherbonnier, Frédéric
and Van der Straeten, Karine
(2026)
Making Auctions for Transport Capacity to Roll.
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy.
This is the latest version of this item.
Abstract
Policymakers increasingly auction upstream inputs to promote downstream competition in network industries, including rail slots, airport slots, spectrum, and transmission rights. We study how selling capacity as a single package versus in sequential tranches affects entry when an incumbent holds an initial endowment. In a two-stage model with Cournot competition downstream, one-shot auctions allow unrestricted incumbents block entry, whereas sequential auctions may incentivize accommodation. Simulations calibrated to the Paris–Lyon route illustrate the sensitivity of entry to tranche design and demand.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | 27 May 2026 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | auctions, open access, rail transportation, regulation |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 15 Oct 2026 13:33 |
| Last Modified: | 15 Oct 2026 13:33 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:132276 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/54113 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Getting auctions for transportation capacity to roll. (deposited 19 Oct 2021 13:32)
- Making Auctions for Transport Capacity to Roll. (deposited 15 Oct 2026 13:33) [Currently Displayed]

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