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She, Huixin
(2026)
Platform Governance and Information Disclosure in Markets with Add-Ons.
TSE Working Paper, n. 26-1778, Toulouse
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Abstract
Digital platforms display sellers' prices and collect ad valorem commissions. We study how these roles shape sellers' disclosure choices and a platform's incentives to regulate them. Sellers offer a base good and an avoidable add-on, which some consumers overlook when choosing sellers. Because commissions apply to the base good but not off-platform add-ons, add-on profit is passed through more than one-for-one into lower base-good prices, creating a competition multiplier. Hidden add-on prices can reduce efficiency while raising consumer surplus through this mechanism. A platform regulates disclosure to protect commission revenue, while mandatory transparency can improve efficiency but reduce consumer surplus.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | October 2026 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Platform governance, add-on pricing, consumer myopia, market transparency, ad-valorem commissions, shrouding, information disclosure |
| JEL Classification: | D11 - Consumer Economics - Theory D21 - Firm Behavior D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information L12 - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies L15 - Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility L81 - Retail and Wholesale Trade; Warehousing; e-Commerce |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 09 Oct 2026 09:21 |
| Last Modified: | 09 Oct 2026 09:22 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:132263 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/54101 |
